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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Gedanken über den empirischen Ursprung der Kausalität. OTTO JANSSEN. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XIV, 3, pp. 318–352.

Causality is not an absolutely necessary category of thought. Induction from the experiences of causal connection cannot establish it as such; attempts to derive it from the principle of identity are futile, for, properly understood, this does not admit of deductions of any kind; while equally unavailing is the conception of the continuity of experience. Though it is perfectly evident that we cannot derive the actual events of nature from any laws of thought, it is sometimes urged that annihilation of any object or quality of an object is inconceivable. Ultimately this rests on a confusion of the identity and continuity of the object with that of experience. The former may well perish while the latter persists, varied and changing as are the sensations. The belief that objects, which have apparently vanished, still continue to exist in changed form is due to our observation that occasionally certain of the qualities persist, or is due to some principle such as the conservation of energy. This latter is not, however, a principle of pure thought but a rule of experience, which has, in the course of time, been developed into a scientific law. Deductions from the continuity and identity of consciousness apply to all successions of phenomena, and therefore fail to give us the distinguishing characteristic of causality. No doubt the origin of the causal idea as applied to the objective world is the moving object. But, while uniform motion as a whole may be considered as either cause or effect yet, in itself, it does not include both. In causal connection change must be exhibited—the resultant must differ from its antecedent. Causality is the application of a principle to events which succeed each other in time. In our thought we must think of cause and effect as simultaneous, for an object acting implies one acted upon. If we posit cause as antecedent it is only by carrying over into it the idea of effect. Wherever there is simultaneity, as in the relations of the sides to the angles of a triangle, we cannot distinguish cause and effect. Thus, while succession fails to give us the full meaning of causation, yet it is only when we can conceive of temporal antecedence that we can have a true conception of cause. What especially differentiates causal connection from logical necessity or the mere change of appearances of phenomena? It is the notion of that power objectified which we feel subjectively whenever we move our limbs at will. Sigwart pointed out that we cannot derive the idea of causality from the will because this implied the former — the will is the causality of the self directed toward conscious movements. To get at the real essence of causality, therefore, we must determine the psychic elements of volition and ascertain that which characterizes the will as causal. The impulse which brings the effect to pass and without which we cannot speak of an act of the will gives us the clue. For, even where no action results, as when a paralytic would will to move his limb, there is yet an accompanying feeling of stress or strain. But it is only when it results in its appropriate action that we have an experience which adequately characterizes the will as causal. As this becomes more mechanical and approaches the causality of reflex action, the feelings of strain become weaker; when subjective causality becomes objective, the notion remains similar except that, instead of the feeling of strain and of power, that of mere succession is emphasized. We consider as causal, therefore, that which in its objective connection manifests regular succession and which contains this notion of power or objectified strain. The scientific principle of equivalence of energy applies to all succession whether there be causal connection or not. Therefore the principle of causation must maintain a functional equivalence of cause and effect, whereas in the idea of cause there is no implication whatsoever regarding a quantitative relation. In the psychic realm causality prevails no less than in the physical — sensations arouse ideas and emotions, ideas call up ideas, etc. Here, however, we are unable to trace any quantitative relation between cause and effect. So also the relations of the physical and psychical to each other are causal, — there is interaction and not mere parallelism. We cannot, of course, apply the principle of causation, because we cannot represent a quantitative equivalence of the cause and effect. We do not represent our psychic world as spatial and our thoughts as having weight and volume. However, this principle of science is not the only conceivable one with which our conception of causality could be connected.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

Idee und Hypothese bei Kant. ERNST LEHMANN. V. f. w. Ph., XXXII, 3, pp. 327–378.

Kant's doctrine of ideas is characterized by an endeavor to solve many apparently factual problems by explaining them as problems of method.

For him ideas are heuristic, regulative principles. Hypotheses, however, aim at facts ; hence, idea and hypothesis he regards as disparate concepts. Lehmann inquires into the apparently presuppositionless character of the ideas, with a view to determine whether they are altogether heuristic, or whether they involve empirical presuppositions. A detailed examination of twelve particular ideas results in a threefold division of the latter. (1) Ideas which can be verified by themselves, touching as they do no problem of an objective-factual nature. Here are included the ideas of the spatial universe, of the totality of past time-changes, of division of matter, of continuity, of uniformity of nature, and of the freedom of the will. As methodological maxims, these contain nothing factual ; when they are hypostatized into Things, Powers, Forces, then problems of appearance arise. To these is added the idea of self-consciousness. (2) Ideas as heuristic principles, which involve definite presuppositions of a factual nature, whose validity can neither be established nor completely overthrown. These are either postulates or desiderata for the purposes of science. Here belong the ideas of causal connection and homogeneity in its particular forms. (3) Ideas containing problems of a factual nature. How is the relation of idea and hypothesis to be determined here ? (*a*) To these ideas which arise from a series-process, correspond ideas of limitation. Such are the problems of the limits of the world in time and space and of the limit of division of matter ; also the problem of the existence of an underlying matter and force in external nature. Hypothetic solutions here are idle and useless as absolute totality is not an object of experience. Hypotheses can deal only with limited, relative magnitudes in time and space and relatively simple forces and matters. (*b*) To those ideas which are not termini of empirical series, but products of spontaneous conceptual acts, correspond the Kantian transcendental problems. Here are classified the ideas of the uniformity of nature, in so far as a factual problem can be derived from it, and the problem of the relation of the psychical to the physical. The above investigation shows, therefore, that Idea and Hypothesis are distinct and sharply separated concepts. Absolute totality, spontaneity and unperceivability characterize the idea. The hypothesis seeks to explain limited factual complexes, relatively simple, constant elements, which can be presented to the sense-perception in space and time. Absolute assertions can either be established by themselves, or not all,— to make them probable, hypothetic, is self-contradictory. The idea of God, again, is separated from the list of principles which can be theoretically formulated. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as a hypothesis. Kant's sharp discrimination between idea and hypothesis is thus justifiable.

R. A. TSANOFF.

Energy and Reality. JOHN E. BOODIN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 15, pp. 393–406.

We have been misled by the name ' energy ' into supposing that we have discovered identity. But the concept of energy is in fact a very complex one. It involves both process and the uniformity of that process. Energy is, then, such a uniformity of processes as makes the prediction of the behavior of things under definite conditions possible ; and nature consists of such predictable processes as can appear in our actual or possible experience. Physical energy still remains an *x* so far as its internal nature is concerned and does not become psychological process. And the number of energies are as many as are needed to account for the diversity of facts. But, if we are to start from the known, we must start with purposive or conative energy, the most basic fact of our mental life, which is not, however, necessarily associated with consciousness. Yet, though there are many energies, there is one universal formula which can be laid down in regard to them all, viz., that all known energies are capable under describable circumstances of making a describable difference to each other. Yet, in order to describe the real world, we need more than energetic constancies. We need space and time as independent variables of reality ; and reality must possess direction and a certain objective form. We must also add consciousness as a dimension, since at least part of the behavior of things is conscious behavior, and it is impossible to state consciousness as energy.

C. WEST.

Consciousness and Reality. II: Consciousness and its Implications. JOHN E. BOODIN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 9, pp. 225–234.

If consciousness makes no real difference to our energetic processes, if mental processes depend on structure, what difference can consciousness make? There are real differences which do not involve quantitative equivalence. Take away from consciousness all that is energetic and we have an abstraction, yet the abstraction is a fact of its own kind. Space is such a reality ; it has no causal relation to the energies in space, it is the condition of their interaction. Consciousness is such a reality ; it makes only the difference of awareness, it is the precondition of awareness. This difference of awareness results from the action of consciousness under certain energetic conditions, which energetic conditions, or structures, determine the value of the awareness. Consciousness, being real, figures as a survival condition, and is a constant. With consciousness, physiological adaptation becomes purpose. Consciousness gives awareness to the process, and the awareness gives meaning. It is not a link in the chain of causality but rather like a medium in which the events travel, a fact over and above the physical changes. The distribution of consciousness is problematic, but for purposes of continuity we may assume it throughout. The problem of individual consciousness is avoided by regarding consciousness as one and undivided. The author goes on to apply this theory to the problems of value, knowledge, subjectivity, immortality, etc., and closes with certain claims for the theory.

E. JORDAN.

L'existence de Dieu d'après Duns Scot. SÉRAPHIN BELMOND. Rev. de Ph., VIII, 9, pp. 241–268; 10, pp. 364–381.

The writer believes that the philosophy of the Middle Ages should not fall into oblivion and that the philosophy of Duns Scotus, in particular, deserves a close study. The arguments of Duns Scotus concerning the existence of God are in answer to the following questions: (1) Is it necessary to prove the existence of God? (2) Is such a proof possible? (3) What is the rational basis for a belief in God?

(1) He rejects the evidence brought by his school in the name of facts, common sense, and logic. For him a proposition is "per se nota" only when proof would be both useless and impossible. Such a proposition must force the approval of the mind by its simple statement. That God exists is not self-evident, except to angels. Duns Scotus is careful to say that he does not wish to prove that God does not exist, but rather to establish a better foundation for the belief that he does exist. If we know God by means of the creation, we have no immediate evidence of Him. If we think of Him as the most perfect being, it is logically uncertain that the most perfect being exists. To argue, 'Truth exists, God is Truth, therefore God exists' would be to commit an error of the consequent. To show that God exists necessarily, proves nothing, for it is neither self-evident, manifest, nor simple.

(2) Without the aid of revelation, man may know God and prove His existence by means of rational argument from the effect to the cause. There is no place for '*a priori*' proof. There can be nothing in the effect which is not contained in the cause. Therefore, in the presence of the effect we must infer the existence of the cause. This conclusion is for Duns Scotus a matter of science. He says, "I do not believe, I know," and knowing that God exists, he believes certain things about Him, that He is a Trinity, and so forth. Moreover, for Duns Scotus the multiplicity of species is reducible to a unity and there is a definite relation between that which precedes and that which follows. There are three kinds of orders: the order of the end, that is, the subordination of beings to a goal, the order of the efficient cause, or subordination of the effect to the cause, and the order in perfection, or the gradual subordination of the less perfect to the more perfect. In all three, it is alike impossible to suppose an infinite regress, hence, there must be a final goal, a first cause and a perfect being.

(3) *a*) This being which is first in the three orders, must be independent, incorporeal, formless and self created, otherwise non-being would have brought something into being, which is an absurdity. We may not suppose the cause of all causes to be less real than secondary causes, hence this first cause exists. Everything in the universe, being essentially limited and controlled by universal and mutual gradations, is placed under the control of a supreme cause, a cause unlimited and infinite in power, in being, and in perfection. *b*) It is the same being which is first in each

order. Every cause seeks a goal; the first cause seeks an ultimate goal and thus becomes identified with its goal. The first cause is not of the same nature as the beings which are caused, but the most exalted of all beings. It is the summit of three faced monolythe. *c*) This being we call God. Therefore, God exists. This conclusion rests upon the fact that the world exists; God is the postulate of contingent reality; therefore God exists. He is the subject in whom the three fundamentals of efficiency, finality, and eminency find themselves reunited. In answer to the question "Why does God allow evil?" Duns Scotus says that evil is necessary in order that man may have free choice. There is no necessity for a free creature to conform to the laws of instinct. They only are responsible who do evil.

HARVEY TOWNSEND.

The Chicago "Idea" and Idealism. E. B. MCGILVARY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 22, pp. 589-597.

The purpose of this article is to state the new meaning of 'idea' in Professor Dewey's writings and to ask some questions which this new meaning suggests. When ideas are used in antithesis to sensation, they have not only a structure and a genesis but also a function, *i. e.*, knowing; thus two abstract sciences are delimited, psychology and epistemology. The pragmatist, denying the necessity for this division, holds that the distinction between ideas and objects is simply instrumental; it is not one between meaning as such and datum as such, but emerges in both datum and ideatum as affairs of logical movement. The psychic and the cosmic are thus merely shifting values in the growing unity of experience. Sensation and image, also, are terms which mark instruments and crises in the development of inferential conclusions. Is not this scheme idealism,—idealism, that is, defined, not according to this new meaning of idea, but according to the current view that reality and experience are convertible terms? Furthermore, if Professor Dewey uses experience in the sense of a shifting thing from which unstable beings often vanish, or in the sense of experience out of which there is no exit, is he not a subjective idealist? Or if what has disappeared from experience still lives on and yet does so in no eternal experience, how does this differ from objectivistic realism? Finally, this scheme affords no means of expressing the difference which indubitably exists between the two kinds of data ordinarily denominated sensation and idea. Can pragmatism, which claims to keep close to experience, afford to ignore this distinction?

EDITH H. MORRILL.

PSYCHOLOGY.

A Qualitative Analysis of Tickling: Its Relation to Cutaneous and Organic Sensation. ELSIE MURRAY. Am. J. Ps., XIX, 3, pp. 289-344.

Are the ticklish sensations aroused by a light touch to be classed as cutaneous or organic? Do they represent pressure, a new pain quality, a complex of tactual or muscular impressions, circulatory sensations reflexly aroused, or pressure and pain in combination? Upon what conditions or peculiarities of content does the subjective character of the tickle consciousness depend? To answer these questions, a preliminary investigation of pressure spots was made. The results indicated that pressure and contact differed in quality, but that contact and tickle were similar. The practical identity of points of maximal sensitivity to tickle and touch and the parallel effects of fatigue corroborate these conclusions for tickle. On the other hand, pressure and contact vary independently, are differently affected by fatigue and drugs, and possess different limens. Moreover, their points of greatest sensitivity are not always identical, and they occur sometimes in association, sometimes in dissociation. Again, contact was found to be indistinguishable from the weak stimulation of superficial pain points. Finally, the Goldscheider granular pressure was found to be a complex of brightness and dull components. Abstracting the dull elements, we have in granular pressure a fusion of points on the verge of disintegration because of temporal or intensive oscillations. A single brightness component of the pressure spot is probably best taken as the tactual unit, sensed in fusion as granular pressure, contact, tickle, and pain. Its nervous substrate is probably the Meissner corpuscle or the nerve endings of the hair follicle. Contact, tickle, and electrically aroused sensations also represent, then, different spatial, temporal, and intensive arrangements of the same elementary brightness sensation. The absence of objective reference seems to be a mark distinguishing tickle from contact. It cannot be so distinguished by faintness or by quality. Characteristic of tickle is vividness, inconstancy, and an ill-defined reference to the epidermis. Its vividness may perhaps be identified with effectiveness of attention; but a medium intensity and a medium amount of analysis are required for tickle, above and below which we have either a blur, a complex, or dull pressure, *i. e.*, we have disconnected sensations either indifferent or verging on pain and capable of individual projection, or complete fusion interpreted as contact and given an objective reference. Again, conditions are favorable for tickle when no one point of the sensation is in the focus of attention. With too slow a rate of oscillation, therefore, or with too high an intensity, the complex tends to fall into individual sensations. This instability of the tickle judgment indicates that tickle should be defined as a complex of intermittent sensations at a certain point of fusion. Tickling may finally be defined as an intensely vivid complex of unsteady, ill-localized, and ill-analyzed sensation, with attention distributed over the immediate sensory contents and the concomitant sensations reflexly aroused. Its power to excite muscular reaction is due in part, doubtless, to the greater effectiveness of intermittent stimulation in exciting reflex centres to action. And this motor reinforcement is probably partly responsible for its great effectiveness for attention. Structurally, tickle differs from touch in its characteristic of a 'feeling' rather than of a perception. By 'feeling' is meant, here, that mass of ill-localized, ill-analyzed sensation, which, because of its cohesion and its persistence, exercises an intrinsic claim upon the attention and is distinguished by its peculiar vividness and its strong dynamogenic value. Tickle as a feeling is allied to the internal sensations or organic complexes, such as hunger or disgust. Tickle, however, fails of analysis and projection, not from lack of external associations at its command, but because of a lack of unity and a baffling swiftness and irregularity, with which the process of perception cannot keep pace. In addition, the kinesthetic sensations it gives rise to tend to amalgamate with it and bind it the more firmly to the subjective. So long as attention is unable to cope with the semi-amalgamated series of impressions which constitutes tickle, this content functions as a whole, the primitive sensori-motor path of least resistance is followed, and we get the reflex shudder, etc. When, however, analysis of the content into its individual components is effected, the energy is expended in the excitation of the sensory and ideational centers, the muscular reaction is largely effaced, and the perception of certain definite sensations of contact succeeds the feeling of tickle.

C. WEST.

The Part Played by Consciousness in Mental Operations. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 16, pp. 421–429. E. A. KIRKPATRICK.

The apparently prominent part that consciousness plays in all new and complex activities is probably in part illusory. Everything that mind does is the result of physiological functioning. Consciousness does nothing but adjust the mechanism by focalizing on one or another element and noting its relation to an end in view, and then note the results. If this be admitted, the phenomena of dreams, hypnotism, double consciousness, and so-called ‘sub-consciousness’ do not differ essentially from the usual mental operations. Were the term ‘subconscious’ used merely to indicate processes carried on without the knowledge of the normal consciousness it would be unobjectionable. When, however, the term is used to indicate states of consciousness unknown to the primary consciousness, we have an entirely different conception from the physiological one.

C. WEST.

The Feeling Problem in Recent Psychological Controversies. C. H. JOHNSTON. Psych. Bull., V, 3, pp. 65–78.

Starting from the well known distinction between the peripheral and the central theory of feeling, the author summarizes various theories and recent investigations. The greater part of the review is devoted to the French authors who take the feeling problem on its physiological side, especially to the researches of Piéron, d'Allonnes, and Pagano. On the basis of work done by François-Franck, Masso, Pagano, and Sherrington, Piéron seems to think that the results of these investigators are crucial in a way, and make it easier to think that emotions can be maintained independently of the support of peripheral contributions. On the other hand, d'Allonnes, relying on Bechterew, has made claims similar to James's rejoinder to his critics. However, in the present state of neurological knowledge, Piéron thinks that a subcortical seat of the emotion is not *a priori* an untenable physiological theory. This enables us to distinguish emotion from the simple sensory results of a cænesthetic complex, as indeed introspection demands. Piéron knows surely that the affective aspect of experience should not be confused with 'somatic impressions,' sensational and cognitive contents. Piéron is dangerously near the plane of Descartes when the latter formulated his theory of the preposterous function of the pineal body. The exposition furnished by d'Allonnes of the serial character of vast central systems harmoniously functioning, and his conception of psychic centres in general, sound more modern and more plausible. It is, however, novel psychology, for example, to hold that intellectual or moral states, with no affective factor, can efficiently (or otherwise) influence conduct. This is almost a return to Platonic psychology.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

The Function of Images. W. H. WINCH. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 13, pp. 337–352.

Not only may images be non-essential to conceptual processes, but they may even be a hindrance. Images certainly do not play the important *rôle* in perception they have been supposed to play; but images, if they come at all, come up slowly, *after* perception. Careful introspection of the processes of comparison and memory, as well as of voluntary movement, will discover the same lack of that imagery which psychologists have so often assumed. The over-estimation of the presence and value of the image is probably largely due to a confusion of image and sensation through imperfect analysis. The image, indeed, feels different from the sensation, but we have inferred images instead of feeling them. The twitchings one feels, for instance, when noting a movement one is about to make, are not images, as supposed, but sensations. It would be well to distinguish also more clearly between the words 'image' and 'idea,' and between the words 'imagery' and 'imagination.'

C. WEST.

Plato's Psychology in its Bearing on the Development of Will. MARY HAY WOOD. Mind, No. 65, pp. 48–73; No. 66, pp. 193–213.

The accusation that Plato's psychology is defective in that he divides the mind into 'faculties' is ill-founded. Plato constantly insists on the activity of the soul as a whole, and in applying the same term to each of the so-called 'faculties,' he clearly indicates that they are mere aspects of one and the same activity. In the *Timæus* mental development is presented as the gradual emergence of order out of a chaos of random movements.

The three divisions of the soul in the *Republic* are to be understood merely as kinds or forms of activity. The innate sense of self-direction is implied in all the processes of assimilation, and constitutes pleasure and pain. Appetite is the lowest form of mental activity, since it has no appearance of guiding principle. Emotion belongs to a form of activity peculiar to animals and man. It reaches its human development when reduced to order; it then becomes the expression of self as subject to law as a part in a whole. By the cultivation of the soul through rhythm, the soul becomes orderly; opinions become determinations. The full development of emotion is found in ἔρως. This is also essentially a self-feeling, and, as self-assertion, would find its own likeness in the surroundings. Thus emotion, while finding its nourishment in the world of appearance, has the impulse after something beyond appearance. Reason, which alone can grasp the whole, unites these two emotions. Of all emotions, the love of beauty conduces most to the development of reason. There are various degrees of development of the reason with respect to the ascendancy of the emotional element. In the lover of wisdom and in the lover of the beautiful, ἔρως has developed into knowledge. In characters of lower type θυμός is predominant. Though there is no fast line between the emotional and the reasoning activity, the mind does not exist as a unity until reason emerges. As ἔρως or θυμός expresses the nature of this transition state viewed from the side of desire, so its condition viewed from the side of knowledge is expressed by δόξα. Δόξα is incomplete and contradictory and does not tally with facts. It is inferior to διάνοια. The mind may possess all the elements in the form of opinions and impressions, and yet until it can fit all these parts into a whole and see the reason of them, it does not know them. The opinions, in order to become organized, have to be bound by the 'tie of cause,' that is, by reason, thought. In the *Philebus* this process is connected with memory. From this we must distinguish recollection, through the operation of which the soul realizes its highest development. The force which makes of self a consistent whole is the power of abstraction. This activity, once aroused, becomes a motive to itself; it becomes actual. Ερως becomes a passion for truth. Truth is the unifying principle which gives form to what was otherwise formless, simplicity to what was complex, wholeness to what was discrete. This is called by Plato the 'Idea of the Good.' The supreme idea is the perfect form of knowledge which would render intelligible the whole of reality. Reason, by reference to the standard which it alone possesses, gives the clue to truth. The 'Idea of the Good' is not only the standard of reason and thought, but the aim of desire and conduct. It is in the expression of the whole self that Plato finds the exercise of the will. In order that the mind may be free to will, it must be directed as a whole towards the attainment of its object; and this can only be when thought and reason are in the ascendant. To say that all men will the Good is only to say that all men have reason. The relation between conduct and reason, self-control and self-knowledge, is indissoluble. In its intermediate and unstable state, it is easy to recognize the characteristic features of *δόξα*. Individual will seems necessary to transcend mere habit or custom. Law, in exacting unreasoning obedience, hinders the free development of mental activity. But law is the will of the community, and the will of the community makes the will of the individual. The development of the more complete activity issuing in reason and will is as follows: In the lowest stage all is taken to belong to self. On the entrance of order there arises a recognition of part and whole. The self is now a part of the body politic with its own proper function and limits. In the further development the self must recognize this relationship as tending toward the fulfilment of the good of the self. If this development does not take place, the good of the self does not embrace the good of the whole. All minds are not capable of this development. Both nature and training go to form the will. If both fail, it remains unformed. But even without the aid of surroundings, the soul may sometimes develop itself. In order to grapple effectually with the problem of heredity, and thus perfect the nature of offspring, Plato advocates state supervision of marriage. In another sense, therefore, the will of the individual is the outcome of the will of the community.

F. A. PEEK.

ETHICS.

Die Ethik Herbert Spencers. HEINRICH KARL SCHWARZE. V. f. w. Ph., XXXII, 1, pp. 1–61.

The author first outlines the fundamental principles of Spencer's metaphysic and epistemology, his definition of evolution, and the deductive and inductive derivations from the evolution-formula. According to Spencer, utilitarian ethics is empirical; it lacks a fundamental principle. He finds in the principle of evolution the needed principle of ethics. The absolutely moral state is the goal of human evolution. Criticising Spencer's view, Schwarze calls ethics an essentially practical science, a branch of philosophy; as such, it must be based in a measure upon all sciences. It needs, however, a supreme principle. Spencer believes that he has discovered this supreme principle in the theory of evolution; but the latter is a principle, not of being, but of becoming. It answers the question how something takes place, but cannot explain why. The logical basis of evolutionism is the principle of causality, which, as a purely formal principle, cannot be employed deductively in ethics. Spencer's evolutionistic principles press him to a radical determinism. This doctrine follows directly from his taking physiology as a basis for psychology. All will-processes, he says, have motion as a necessary presupposition. Yet the origin of the will-process is not thoroughly explained. Since the contents of consciousness, as psychical, stand outside mechanical necessity, the independence of the will may only be psychical. The scientific character of ethics, on the one hand, and the moral ideal, on the other, necessitate, for Spencer, a distinction between absolute and relative ethics. Ultimately, however, his doctrine of absolute ethics is the expression of a utopian optimism. Adaptation and heredity, although mighty factors of human evolution, are yet inadequate to bring about the absolute ethical state. For Spencer, the goal and essence of moral activity, naturally defined, is the perfection of life, both of the ego and of society. Culturally determined, good and bad conduct are respectively conduct well or ill-adapted to ends, pleasurable or painful, developed or undeveloped conduct. The universal criterion of the worth of life is happiness. The writer presents Spencer's interpretation of ethics from the four scientific points of view: physical, biological, psychological, and sociological. The Spencerian position is then criticised in detail. Spencer begins his ethics here with the same question as in the *Social Statics:* What is the goal of morality? The evolutionary standpoint indicates as such a goal the perfection of life. Schwarze objects to the identification of the goals of ethical activity and universal activity, and regards the teleological interpretation of the latter as unjustifiable. For Spencer, culture is crystallized and objectified adaptation. Life is an end in itself. Then, self-preservation, in the Nietzschean sense, should have been regarded as the highest goal of action. Moral action cannot be explained in terms of adaptation to ends, since ends exist subjectively, and morality cannot be merely individualistic. Spencer's secondary definitions of good and evil, as pleasurable and painful, developed and undeveloped, indicate his inborn optimism and his confusion of the general meaning of good with its specific moral meaning. He really has two goals of moral action, happiness and life. That the two are not identical is evident to Spencer himself; hence, he makes the distinction between absolute and relative ethics, identifying life and happiness in the former. The dualism, however, remains for the latter. His 'physical view' is hardly tenable; for it is not true that greater coherence and manifoldness distinguish the moral from the immoral. The biological arguments do not explain the non-congruence of life and happiness, of the normal and the moral, in the relative ethical state. The psychological chapter, devoted especially to the relative state, is an acknowledgment of the supremacy of the will. The writer examines in this connection Spencer's theory of conscience, and compares it with Wundt's. The sociological view regards the individual's well-being as the goal of social life. Society and individual should be regarded as correlates. Schwarze's criticism of Spencer's ideal state, as being an evolutionistic Utopia, is followed by a discussion of the attempted compromise between egoism and altruism. The writer thinks that egoism is left still in the ascendent.

R. A. TSANOFF.

L'independance de la morale. PAUL GAULTIER. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 3, pp. 256–273; 4, pp. 389–409.

Because of the weakening of beliefs and the extension of the scientific spirit, morality is being freed from the *a priori* principles and deduced codes of duties upon which it long rested. As a consequence, it is losing ground even while attempts are being made to found it scientifically. Such attempts are not new; Spinoza explained ethics *more geometrico*, while Diderot and Holbach modelled it upon natural science; in fact, the various social forces and aspects of life have been employed. All these attempts are based upon hasty generalizations. Biology cannot reach the mental life, and appeal to it is unscientific. Nor can ethics be founded upon sociology, for society is only a fact, and it cannot be shown why I should sacrifice myself for it. Moreover, my relations to society show nothing resembling obligation. The evolutionary theory of Spencer holds that matters of conduct are directed by the process of development, that our individual inclinations will be converted into disinterested inclinations. But the law of evolution, being merely an abstraction, cannot teach us what we ought to do. All these attempts to found morality on science fail: (1) because they lack an ideal, which deprives morality of all direction, or motive; and (2) because the external method employed deprives morality of that which explains and constitutes it, *i. e.*, conscience. According to Lévy-Bruhl, morality is what one does, science is theory. The one acts, the other observes. Applied to morality, science should register customs or manners. Hence it follows that science cannot become morality without losing its scientific character, and morality cannot become science except on the condition of not being morality; for in morals the scientist cannot take the scientific attitude of disinterestedness, since he is engaged in the action which is his subject-matter. In spite of Lévy-Bruhl's contention, there can only result from the conviction of the illegitimacy of a science of morals a practical scepticism that permits the non-morality of which Nietzsche is an example when he reverses the scheme of values and denies to ethics the title of science. Objective science cannot found morality, but tends rather to abolish it; for a science is non-moral in that it does not reach the spirit of things. But are there not facts of morality, and cannot a science of these facts be formulated? There are such facts, known immediately and without any intermediary, and there is also a science of these facts. From the internal and psychological point of view, there is a morality. There is the fact of the conscience of man, of an ideal to be realized, which commands or forbids action; an ideal at first indistinct and confused, but becoming more and more clear until it becomes a moral ideal. In short, there is a will imposing a law upon itself and subordinating itself to the law. This fact is our guide and criterion, and its proof is the approval or disapproval with which we judge the actions of ourselves and others. It is not only a fact, but a practical necessity. It is not only a normal motive, but a motive necessary to all psychic life. Morality is given in human experience anterior to all systems, and moral action is prior to the science of which it constitutes the object. To explain morality by means of sociology is to regard the moral consciousness as an epi-phenomenon. Perfection is the ideal of nature, not only of human nature, but also of all living nature, and, in a measure, of inorganic nature. Pleasure and well-being are not ends, but signs of progress towards perfection. We determine our ends or moral ideals by comparison and induction, and from the ends thus determined the moralist deduces the particular duties which are the objects of 'applied' morality. Ethics has for subject-matter not so much what is, as what ought to be. Its certitude is neither logical nor sensible, but moral; that is, it does not rest upon evidence of sense or upon rational evidence, but its evidence is internal. Ethics is thus a science of a special type because of the peculiarity of what it studies, and sciences of the external world are of little use either in founding it or supplementing it. Yet the reality upon which ethics rests is not only psychical, but a human reality, a social and cosmic reality. The biological, social, and physical sciences confirm morality, yet they cannot found it. Ethics is independent not only of the other sciences but also of metaphysics and religion.

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